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FOREWORD
Because of the seamlessly international nature of
the Internet, effective cyber security demands close
cooperation with allies and friends overseas. Yet,
because of the relatively young status of the discipline, national approaches to organizing and providing for cyber defense vary widely even among those
countries whose interests are most closely aligned
with those of the United States. The result is that the
bodies and structures responsible for cyber defense,
and their affiliations and mandates, can be difficult to
understand.
In this Letort Paper, British cyber policy researcher
Keir Giles and German computer security specialist
Kim Hartmann provide an overview of four different
national approaches to cyber defense: those of Norway, Estonia, Germany, and Sweden. While providing a useful guide for engagement with the relevant
governmental and other organizations in each of these
countries, the Paper also compares and contrasts the
advantages and drawbacks of each national approach.
In doing so, the authors provide a valuable resource for policymakers in the cyber security field,
identifying potential best practices that could be
applied in the United States and elsewhere.
		
		
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Despite the history of offensive cyber activity being much longer than is commonly thought, cyber
defense is still considered a new discipline. It is only
relatively recently that states have established formal
structures to provide for cyber defense, and cyber security more broadly. In this context, each nation has
developed its own mix of public, private, and military
organizations active in the field.
The relationships between these organizations are
based on the nation’s unique circumstances, determining the overall shape of relations between the state and
business, the approach to e-government, civilian control of the military, threat perception, and much more.
The United States is no exception and has developed
its own approach to organizing cyber defense based
on factors specific to it. But the wide range of organizational approaches to reaching a “best fit” template
for successful cyber defense raises the possibility that
other nations may have developed approaches that
could be usefully adopted in a U.S. context.
This Paper introduces four different foreign approaches to cyber defense, each very different from
the U.S. model. In surveying the cyber defense organizations of Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Estonia,
the Paper aims not only to provide baseline information on overseas structures and planning in order to
facilitate U.S. cooperation with international partners,
but also to provide policymakers with an overview
of effective alternative approaches that may be applicable in a U.S. context.
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CYBER DEFENSE:
AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW
Despite the history of offensive cyber activity being much longer than is commonly thought, cyber
defense is still considered a new discipline.1 It is only
relatively recently that states have established formal
structures to ensure cyber defense, and cyber security
more broadly. In many nations, these structures are
still in a state of flux as the optimum approach to defense against cyber threats for the military, the economy, the government, and the population as a whole is
still elaborated.
In this context, each nation has developed its own
mix of public; private; and military organizations, and
the relationships between them based on their own
unique circumstances—relations between the state
and business, approach to e-government, civilian control of the military, threat perception, and much more.
The United States is no exception and has developed
its own approach to organizing cyber defense based
on factors specific to the United States.
But the broad variety of organizational approaches
to reaching a “best fit” template for successful cyber
defense raises the possibility that partner and ally nations may have developed approaches that can be successfully adopted in a U.S. context. This Paper therefore surveys the approaches of four partner states, in
order to present them in an easily accessible form for
U.S. policymakers. In introducing foreign approaches
to cyber defense that may not be obvious in a U.S. context, the aim is also to provide baseline information
on overseas structures and planning to facilitate U.S.
cooperation with international partners.
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The Paper is specifically not concerned with technical capabilities in cyber offense and cyber defense.
It is notoriously difficult to reach reliable conclusions
about cyber capabilities from open sources. The extent of real capabilities, or in some instances the lack
of them, is so deeply classified that an unclassified
publication on the subject would consist mostly of unfounded speculation. Nevertheless, in some European
societies with a tradition of openness of information,
it is possible to draw inferences about organizational
aspects of preparations for cyber defense, as opposed
to actual capabilities, on the basis of open sources and
direct approaches to defense organizations.
The countries selected for examination are Estonia,
Germany, Norway, and Sweden, in that order. This is
because:
1. Estonia has a number of claims to pioneer status
in cyber defense. This state has practical experience of
protecting itself against offensive online activity combined with a real-world destabilization campaign, in
what is widely (if questionably) considered the first
overt state-on-state cyber attack in May 2007. Tallinn is host to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Combined Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), set up in 2008 in what was widely
(but again, wrongly) considered to be a response to
those attacks. Estonia is at the forefront of moving
government services online; personal identification
acts as a key to an impressive range of services that
other states consider unsafe to operate through the
Internet. Governmental and societal embrace of the
Internet is exemplified in the President of the Republic, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, an enthusiastic participant
in social media, Internet freedom activist, and chair
of the “Panel on the Future of Global Internet Coop-
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eration,” a body set up by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers to develop future
principles for Internet governance. For all of these reasons, Estonia presents a useful case study of what can
be achieved if the political will to implement radical
change is present.
2. Germany represents a major economy, guided
by (broadly) the same principles as the United States
with regard to the balance between security and individual rights and freedoms online but subject to
historical, institutional, and European constraints that
do not apply to the United States. In this respect, Germany offers an example of a G7 state (United States,
Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and
Canada) that has chosen a different model to protect
its online networks.
3. Norway is in a unique position within Europe,
being an active and enthusiastic member of NATO,
but remaining outside the European Union (EU). The
constraints and opportunities for Norway’s foreign
and defense policy therefore differ from those of other
states, and this singularity is reflected in a number of
specific Norwegian approaches to security and economic challenges. Close cooperation with the United
States is one of these opportunities.
4. Sweden has, in some ways, the reverse challenge. As a member of the EU but not of NATO, Sweden (along with its neighbor, Finland) has to maintain
a delicate balancing act. The benefits of close cooperation with the United States and NATO are clear
and unarguable, but this is a topic of intense domestic sensitivity. Sweden’s traditionally robust and independent stance on defense issues has come under
threat,2 but the emphasis on cyber security—and on
the international cooperation necessary to maintain
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it—remains strong. In addition, Sweden presents the
paradox of a society that traditionally has been among
the most open and democratic in the world, hosting
defense and intelligence programs, including in the
cyber sector whose secrecy is more closely guarded
than those of almost all European partners.
For each of these countries, a survey of institutions
and declaratory policy on the basis of publicly available documentation has been supplemented by interviews with officials active in cyber security. In each
case, while these officials were willing to confirm details of national cyber security structures, they did not
wish to be identified or linked to specific comments.
The summaries at the end of each national section
and in the conclusion are in part based on these nonattributable interviews.
It will be seen that there are both synergies and dissonances between the national approaches adopted by
each of these states. These national approaches remain
crucial in the apparent absence of real supranational
support for cyber defense. Even after the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO’s cyber strategy appears
to remain an anti-strategy, devolving cyber defense to
member states.3 Meanwhile, the EU’s European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) appears similarly to limit its ambition to being a center
for expertise and information sharing.4
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ESTONIA
Estonia is reputed to be the country with the
world’s highest Internet penetration rate. In December 2011, this rate was already 78 percent.5 This results
from deliberate government policy rooted in the early
days of Estonia’s renewed independence in the early1990s. At that time, Estonia took the strategic decision not to attempt to renew or overhaul the wholly
insufficient and backward Soviet telecommunications
system, and instead adopted modern systems such
as mobile phone networks in parallel. The result is
a highly advanced technical infrastructure, with few
of the problems of reliance on legacy telecommunications systems and hardware that have restrained
Internet uptake elsewhere.
A further strategic decision was to develop systems
to provide state services to all citizens online, in part as
a result of Estonia’s relatively low population density.
The development of these e-services made Estonia a
world leader in the field and contributed to Estonia’s
impressive record of post-Soviet growth. However, as
the 2007 attacks on Estonia showed, it also presents
vulnerabilities. Estonia therefore presents an example
of an approach to protecting cyber infrastructure and
critical data where not only is a key adversary already
known and present, but also the concentration of
citizen processes online (including but not limited to
banking, voting, registering commercial transactions,
and so on) means that there is no alternative to reliable
defense.
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General Structure.
Cyber security in Estonia is mainly organized
through the Estonian Information System Authority
(EISA) and its subunits. EISA is part of the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Communications but may
also cooperate closely with the Ministry of Justice,
Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of the Interior.
In addition, the Defense League (Kaitseliit), a voluntary defense organization along military lines, also
contributes to “the protection of Estonia’s independence and constitutional order.” A cyber unit cooperates closely with governmental institutions and initiatives. Known as the Küberkaitseliit, this is made up of
volunteer cyber security experts.
Detail.
EISA.
EISA, also known by its Estonian abbreviation RIA,
was reorganized in 2011 from the former Estonian Informatics Centre and is structurally integrated in the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications.6
EISA coordinates cyber security actions for both the
private and public sector. These activities include
the development, administration, and supervision of
cyber security actions.7
EISA publishes an annual report summarizing
events, activities, and observations related to cyber
security in Estonia.8 EISA is also taking part in the
NutiKaitse 2017 project promoting security on smart
devices and aimed at users, developers, and retailers.9
EISA is the governing authority of two other bodies, Department of Critical Information Infrastructure
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Protection (CIIP) and Computer Emergency Response
Team of Estonia (CERT-EE), which are discussed
next. EISA also provides the Document Exchange
Centre and supervises the implementation of Infosüsteemide Kolmeastmeline Etalonturbe Süsteem (threelevel information technology [IT] baseline security
system), abbreviated ISKE, at the national level. ISKE
is based on the German IT-Grundschutzkatalog (see the
section on Germany for further details).10
EISA also provides information on the Data Exchange Layer X-Road. X-Road is described as being
“a technical and organizational environment, which
enables secure Internet-based data exchange between
the state’s information systems.”11 Furthermore, EISA
is involved in the management, maintenance, and support of the national Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
This implies involvement in supporting the Estonian
identification (ID) card system, used to provide secure
access to many online services.12
Department of Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection.
CIIP is a subunit of EISA. CIIP focuses on “issues
associated with the protection of technical infrastructures needed to guarantee the functioning of the Estonian state.” The Estonian Emergency Act provides
a list of 42 essential services that need to be assured,
including payments and settlements.13
CIIP operates on the strategic level by collecting,
maintaining, and analyzing data regarding critical
information infrastructures in Estonia. CIIP also performs risk assessment for these infrastructures, and
initiates and supervises the development and implementation of protective measures.14
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Linked to its actions on the strategic level, CIIP issues guidelines on cyber security, such as the regulation on security measures for information systems of
vital services and related information assets15 and the
Estonian Cybersecurity Strategy 2008-2013.16
CIIP operates under the information security interoperability framework,17 a description of IT-security
principles observed in Estonia and how state institutions and vital service providers are to interoperate.18
CIIP recommends security measures based on a
number of foreign best practice manuals. These are the
U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit Cyber-Security Check
List, in a version last updated in 2007;19 ISKE, based
on German documentation as described previously;
and the United Kingdom (UK) Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) Guidelines on
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Security.20
ISKE provides a range of documentation on security guidelines that, unlike much other materials, are
only available in Estonian.21 These include:
•	ISKE material and handbook (ISKE juhendid ja
materjalid)
— Implementation guidelines (ISKE rakendusjuhend ver. 7.00)22
— ISKE catalogue version 7.0 (ISKE kataloogid
ver. 7.00)23
• Suggested guidelines (Soovituslikud juhendid)
— Data center security requirements (Andmekeskuse turvanõuded)24
—
Cryptographic algorithms, uses, and life
cycle study (Krüptograafiliste algoritmide kasutusvaldkondade ja elutsükli uuring).25
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Computer Emergency Response Team of Estonia.
The CERT-EE is another subunit of EISA. CERT-EE
defines its main tasks as:
• Reviewing and reporting on incidents;
•	Providing warnings and notices, and the organization of preventive measures such as campaigns to raise public awareness; and,
•	
Support for institutions and Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). The extent of support depends on the security incident reported and
the resources available. As a general policy, no
end-user support is given.26
As a subunit of EISA, CERT-EE also provides and
develops the Virtual Situation Room (VSR) in cooperation with Clarified Networks Finland,27 acquired
by the Finnish-U.S. corporation Codenomicon in
2011.28 VSR, financed by the European Regional Development Fund, is a unified platform used for cyber
security situation information sharing, analysis and
visualization of data, providing training material
and simulations, and post-crisis analysis and crisis
management improvement techniques.29 VSR is accessible to governmental institutions and companies
providing vital services.30
Küberkaitseliit.
Küberkaitseliit is the cyber unit of the Defense
League (Kaitseliit). The Kaitseliit is “a voluntary
militarily organized national defense organization”
that possesses arms, engages in military exercises,
and fulfils the tasks prescribed by the National Defense League Act.31 Its cyber subdivision is made up
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of cyber security professionals who volunteer their
time and skills for national defense, with main tasks
listed as:
• Protection of Estonia’s e-lifestyle,
•	Public-private cooperation in protecting IT infrastructure, and
• Knowledge and information sharing.
The Küberkaitseliit supports government institutions in implementing the national cyber security
strategy and—especially in a crisis situation—cooperates closely with CERT-EE and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.32
Summary.
The Estonian approach to cyber security rests
on a clear division but smooth cooperation between
state actors, the public sector, and the Estonian Defence League. This is supported by extensive public
documentation and a clear sense of purpose from
government.
Estonia also makes strong contributions to European and international cooperation on cyber security,
but not all public documentation is provided in languages other than Estonian. This is surprising in the
case, for instance, of the ISKE, which is based on the
German BSI-Grundschutzkatalog, a document that is
already—at least partially—available in English.
The establishment of overarching structures to
facilitate cooperation between providers of essential
services is a priority. Estonia actively promotes the
individual’s role in cyber security issues, the need
for infrastructures that allow smooth interaction,
high-quality communications, and the integration of
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nonstate institutions and companies in national cyber
strategies.
Estonia has embraced the concept that cyber
conflict cannot be resisted through governmental
institutions alone, but must rather be approached
through the collaboration of government institutions,
nongovernmental organizations, and private sector
companies.
GERMANY
The first German strategies on a federal level to protect technical infrastructure against malfunction arose
in response to the “millennium bug.” As elsewhere,
during the 1990s, automation of technical communication, transportation, information, and organization
systems had risen in importance for military, governmental, and industrial organizations in Germany. The
Y2K problem raised national awareness of vulnerabilities accompanying reliance on technical systems. The
potential effect on individual citizens primarily was
gauged as a factor of their dependence on national
or industrial services; home computers, laptops, and
other technical equipment used for private purposes
were not considered targets of national relevance.
The importance of protecting technical infrastructure against both deliberate and accidental destruction, disturbance, and malfunction was publicly
acknowledged during the first years of the 21st century. The establishment of the first federal strategic
program to protect technical infrastructures in 2002
was immediately tested by a natural disaster—unprecedented flooding that severely affected a number
of European countries.33 Widespread malfunctions of
technical infrastructure throughout the affected area
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hindered emergency management and increased the
damage. The result was greater acknowledgement of
the need to protect technical infrastructure and greater prominence of the effects on individual citizens in
public discussion. Nevertheless, awareness of risk
associated with privately used information technology is still deficient, both within civil society as well
as in industrial, government, and occasionally even
military applications.
General Structure.
The Cabinet of Germany (Bundesregierung) is the
chief national executive body at federal level. It consists of the elected chancellor (Bundeskanzler) and the
cabinet ministers.34 Each cabinet minister is responsible for one specific sector of national interest. The
responsibility for these sectors is currently divided
among 14 federal ministries.35 Overlaps between the
scope of these ministries can occur, and this is particularly the case when considering protection against
cyber threats.
Figure 1 lists some of the many ministries and their
associated special agencies that are involved in cyber
defense in Germany. Interactions between the following institutions in particular are key to understanding
the German approach to cyber security and will be
discussed further:
• The German Chancellery
—F
 ederal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst)
• Federal Ministry of the Interior
—F
 ederal Office for Information Security
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI)

12

— Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz)
— Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt)
• Federal Ministry of Defense
—
Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst)
—
Federal Defense Forces of Germany
(Bundeswehr)
-S
 trategy Reconnaissance Command (Kommando Strategische Aufklärung, especially the
Abteilung Informations und Computernetzwerkoperationen)36
• Federal Ministry of Finance
— Customs Criminal Investigation Office
(Zollkriminalamt)
• Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology
Detail.
Due to the complex federalized nature of German
administration, many German cyber defense activities
are managed through joint programs. This is in part a
result of legal constraints arising from constitutional
emphasis on division between state, civilian, and military actions, which means that activities within each
sector must be clearly distinguishable from those in
another. As a result, synergies between each responsible agency are limited. For example, even if a joint
program allows military institutions to cooperate with
the police, this can only happen if the specific incident under investigation is a clearly defined military
responsibility.37
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Figure 1. Selection of German Ministries and Departments Involved in Cyber Defense.

KRITIS.
Several programs have been developed to meet a
range of challenges associated with the protection of
critical infrastructures, referred to generically as KRITIS. The primary programs are UP KRITIS (Umsetzungsplan KRITIS),38 UP Bund (Umsetzungsplan Bund)39
and KRITIS-Strategie.40
The two UP programs were developed in 2005
from the previous “Nationaler Plan zum Schutz der Informationsinfrastrukturen” (National Plan for Information Infrastructure Defense, NPSI) program.41 While
UP KRITIS is concerned with the general protection
of IT infrastructure of the telecommunication, energy,
transportation, and economic sectors, UP Bund covers the protection of federal IT infrastructure. Both UP
programs are considered policymaking institutions;
technical implementation of recommendations made
through the UPs becomes the responsibility of sectors
and organizations for which they are responsible.
KRITIS-Strategie, the “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection,” was drawn up in 2009
on the basis of knowledge gained from UP KRITIS,
and summarizes Germany’s objectives and strategic
political approach in this area. The Strategy extended
the initial remit of the program and included IT infrastructure as one of the critical infrastructures to be
protected.42 Protection of IT infrastructure has been allocated to the National Cyber Defense Center and the
National Cyber Security Council, created under the
Cybersecurity Strategy released in 2009.43
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The National Cyber Defense Center.
The National Cyber Defense Center was established as a response to growing threats, in particular
the increasing number of highly specific and organized
attacks on governmental and industrial information
systems in Germany. The Center coordinates the numerous ministries, departments, and special agencies
involved in national cyber defense. In this way, the
existence of the Center underlines the German view
that cyber attacks come in a variety of forms and vectors, and as such must not be addressed through only
one federal institution.44
The Center is operated by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) and includes representation from the Federal Agency for the Protection of the
Constitution, Federal Office of Civil Protection and
Disaster Assistance, Federal Criminal Police Office,
Federal Police, Customs Criminal Investigation Office,
Federal Intelligence Service, and the Federal Defense
Forces of Germany (Bundeswehr). Each agency contributes personnel with specific responsibilities, who
remain affiliated to their original office. As a result,
implementation of tasks assigned within the Center
become the responsibility of the contributing agency. The Cyber Center also cooperates directly with
German ISPs.
The Center’s main tasks are the prevention of cyber
attacks, information sharing on attacks and vulnerabilities, and early warning for exposed and threatened
institutions. According to the BSI, the Center analyzes
and reports on vulnerabilities found in IT products,
incidents, infrastructural vulnerabilities, and cyber attack methods. It also analyzes incidents to generate attack and attacker profiles. The Center is the technical
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adviser to the National Cyber Security Council (Cyber
Sicherheitsrat), which was founded simultaneously
with the Center.
Due to the scope of the institutions involved, and
control resting with the BSI, the Center is more likely
to be a reactive than a proactive or offensive institution and is mainly concerned with incident response,
forensics, and policy actions. The German military organization corresponding to the Cyber Center is the
Kommando Strategische Aufklärung. Oblique references
in open sources suggest that the Kommando has been
developing offensive cyber capabilities45 since, at the
latest, 2009.46
The National Cyber Security Council.
The main task of the Council is to enhance exchanges between governmental and industrial organizations on preventive cyber measures on a political
and strategic level. Recent topics for discussion have
been the protection of critical infrastructure and the
cyber foreign policy of Germany.
The Council meets three times a year and is chaired
by the Commissioner of the Federal Government for
Information Technology. The Council is composed
of one state secretary and representatives from the
German Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Defense, the Federal
Ministry of Economics and Technology, the Federal
Ministry of Justice, the Federal Ministry of Finance,
the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and
representatives of the federal states Baden-Württemberg and Hessen. Furthermore, business representatives from the BDI (Federation of German Industries),
BITKOM (Federal Association for Information Tech-
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nology, Telecommunications and New Media), DIHK
(Chambers of Commerce and Industry), and Amprion
(the largest corporation responsible for the German
electricity distribution network, with a major role
in European electricity distribution more broadly47)
act as associated members of the Council. Technical
experts may also be involved in specific events.48
IT Baseline Protection Catalogs.
The IT Baseline Protection Catalogs (IT-Grundschutzkataloge) are a collection of documents provided
by the BSI for the protection of IT infrastructure and
the identification and eradication of vulnerabilities in
IT systems. They serve as a basis for certifying enterprises for IT security compliance. They are divided
into three sub-catalogs covering components, threats,
and measures. Each uses a layer model to describe different aspects of the topic presented.
The component catalogs are divided into five layers: general aspects, infrastructure, IT systems, networks, and IT applications. Each layer is addressed
to a specific audience.49 They describe different methods and actions to be taken for each IT component in
different situations. Recommendations are provided
throughout the component life cycle.50
The threat catalogs describe the range of vulnerabilities associated with IT components and are divided
into the following layers: force majeure, organizational
deficiencies, human failures, technical failures, and
deliberate acts.51 Each threat and its source is briefly
described, followed by examples of possible outcomes
and their effects on the component.
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The measures catalogs describe the countermeasures to be taken in order to protect systems, subdivided into Infrastructure, Organizational, Personal,
Hardware/Software, Communication, and Emergency Response.52 Each countermeasure identifies the
individual responsible for initiation and execution,
followed by a specific description of the actions to
be taken. The measures catalogs also provide checklists to monitor correct implementation and to verify
the results.
As noted in the section on Estonia, which has
based some of its own documentation on these catalogs, a number of these documents are also available
in English.53
CERTs.
As in other states, the term Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT) refers to a group of IT experts consulted during serious incidents. CERTs exist
within a range of organizations and businesses. The
key governmental CERTs are the Bürger-CERT (Public
CERT), CERT-Bund (CERT-Federal), and the CERTBw
(CERT Federal Defense).
The Bürger-CERT provides technical information
on IT vulnerabilities, viruses, worms, cyber attacks,
and methods through information boards, newsletters, and mailing lists to technically interested individuals. This is a free service provided through the
BSI, using data obtained from the CERT-Bund.54 A second service, aimed to inform the broader public (i.e.,
including individuals who are not technically adept),
is provided through the BSI on the website BSI für
Bürger (BSI for Citizens).55
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The CERT-Bund and the IT-Lagezentrum56 together
make up Department C-21 of the BSI.57 Within the department, the CERT is the technical solution center for
security issues faced in federal institutions, while the
IT-Lagezentrum collects security data from multiple national and international sources. Together, this allows
Department C-21 to provide detailed assessments of
security issues. Depending on the result of this assessment, warnings may be forwarded to the Bürger-CERT
or the relevant KRITIS authorities.58 It is reported that
the IT-Lagezentrum not only relies on the data pools
provided, but also carries out network monitoring “to
detect irregularities.”
The CERTBw is the Federal Defense Forces
(Bundeswehr) CERT. The CERTBw is responsible for
the monitoring, maintenance, and restoration of IT
security for the German military forces. Its responsibilities also include incident response and management and network monitoring and analysis. CERTBw
also analyzes vulnerabilities in the German military
IT infrastructure, analyzes malware, and provides an
information and alert service.
CERTBw reports that the number of hostile incidents it deals with has remained steady at 700-800 per
year for the last 4 years.59 This figure is startlingly low.
When asked to explain this, one interviewee suggested that this could be a result of the strict delineation of
authorities within the German system, which would
mean that attacks on public-facing military websites
would not be included in this figure:
Perhaps one should rather say [the CERTBw reporting] ‘counts approx. 800 incidents per year on technical infrastructures lying within its area of responsibility’? I also think that the number is incredibly low and,
knowing the German system, I believe the reason is
20

that a lot of stuff will not fall under their authority. I
could imagine that for example the public sites of the
German Forces are not part of the CERTBw authority
and so on.60

The CERTBw is also responsible for the security
of IT infrastructure used during active military
operations.61
Summary.
Overall, Germany seems to promote an open access policy regarding its cyber defense strategies.
Both policy documents and technical details are available from official websites. Once the infrastructure
and organizational details are clear, further details
can be deduced from official job offers, which often
include specifics of the level of knowledge needed,
the type of technical infrastructure to be worked on,
and the tasks to be undertaken during employment.62
Even organizational details not directly available
through agency websites normally can be accessed
through the Bundesverwaltungsamt (Federal Office of
Administration).63
NORWAY
General Structure.
Public attention to the defense of cyberspace has
increased enormously in Norway over recent years.64
Cyberforsvaret (Cyber Defense) is a forsvarsgren (military branch) of the Norwegian Armed Forces alongside the Norwegian Air Force, Army, Navy, and Home
Guard. The Cyberforsvaret was established in 2012,
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denoting Norway as one of the countries that officially acknowledge cyberspace as a new military
domain. The integration of cyberspace as a military
branch expresses the importance of the topic to the
Norwegian government.
Other institutions involved in the cyber defense
programs of Norway under the auspices of the Armed
Forces include Nasjonala Sikkerhetsmyndigheten (National Security Authority, or NSM)65 and the Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team (NorCERT). Furthermore, depending on the type of attack
experienced, either the Etterretningstjenesten (Norwegian Intelligence Service, the intelligence service
of the Norwegian Armed Forces) or the Norwegian
Police Service may respond to an attack with further
investigations.
The police service is responsible for any attack/
criminal activity on the Internet originating from within Norway against Norwegian infrastructures or individuals; it investigates the attack and initiates further
activities. The Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste (Norwegian
Police Security Service) and Kripos (nasjonale enhet for
bekjempelse av organisert og annen alvorlig kriminalitet,
former Kriminalpolitisentralen, translated to National
Criminal Investigation Service) are involved in the
investigations as appropriate. In addition, the Norwegian government has established the Norsk senter
for informasjonssikring (Norwegian Center for Information Security, NorSIS), to heighten public awareness
of cyber threats and possible countermeasures.
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Detail.
Cyberforsvaret.
Established on September 18, 2012, as an independent military branch of the Norwegian Armed Forces,
Cyberforsvaret evolved from the Forsvarest informasjonsinfrastruktur (Defense Information Infrastructure)
department of the Norwegian Armed Forces and has a
manpower of approximately 1,100.66 The main task of
Cyberforsvaret is to establish cyberspace (cyberrommet)
as a full-fledged military domain.67 It is responsible for
the development of defense methods for cyberspace
and for the protection of military components from
threats originating from cyberspace. Cyberforsvaret is
not responsible for protection of public infrastructure
but may support public organizations such as NorSIS
upon request.
Cyberforsvaret is organized into two major departments, responsible for “competence and transformation” and “services and operations” with several subdepartments. The branch is scheduled to introduce
offensive cyber capabilities by 2016,68 noting that:
Military operations in the digital space have both
protective and intelligence purposes and offensive
objectives/goals. This has been an added dimension
of military operations and thus a new warfare area
where the ability to conduct both defensive and offensive operations will be crucial in future conflicts.69

Cyberforsvaret is currently offering research positions in cyber security. Researchers are to be integrated and employed in the newly established Center for
Cyber and Information Security (CCIS) at the Gjøvik
University College. The CCIS is the result of a part23

nership between “key national cyber security stakeholders.”70 The CCIS thus provides significant detail
on the nature and extent of cooperation on cyber security between Norwegian military, police, and public
institutions.71
Nasjonala Sikkerhetsmyndigheten.
The NSM is a sub-division of the Försvarsdepartmentet (Defense Department) and is responsible for
the coordination of preventive security measures and
for monitoring the current security status. The NSM’s
primary tasks are countermeasures against espionage, sabotage, and terrorism, and the protection of
sensitive information.
The NSM is Norway’s key body responsible for the
control and organization of information and physical
security activities. Although the NSM belongs to the
Försvarsdepartmentet, it also reports to the Justis- og
Politidepartment (Ministry of Justice and Public Security) with respect to public information security interests.72 The NSM also publishes annual reports on Norway’s security status (Rapport om sikkerhetstilstanden)73
and is the host organization for NorCERT.
NorCERT.
NorCERT is the operational taskforce of the NSM.
NorCERT reports on current cyber security threats
that may pose a risk to national security and may also
take part in incident response and analysis. Although
NorCERT is hosted by the NSM, it also cooperates
closely with a range of nongovernmental bodies in the
varslingssystem for digital infrastruktur (warning system
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for digital infrastructures, or VDI). The VDI was initiated as a joint project between the Etterretningstjenesten, Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste (Intelligence Service,
Police Service) and NSM in 2000.74
The VDI controls a number of sensors installed at
ISPs to monitor data traffic. VDI sensors had been installed at Norsk rikskringkasting AS, NRK (Norwegian
Broadcasting Corporation—a government owned radio and television broadcasting company)75 in 2006,
but NRK decided to remove them amid widespread
controversy over data capture and monitoring in
November 2012.76
NorSIS.
NorSIS forms part of a Norwegian government initiative to heighten public awareness of cyber security
threats and their impact on everyday life as well as on
national security and is hosted by the Justis- og beredskapsdepartmentet (Ministry of Justice). Its major task is
to inform, analyze, and recommend countermeasures
against cyber security threats for the public. NorSIS is
responsible for both the private and public sector, and
may request support from Cyberforsvaret or NorCERT.
NorSIS also compiles guidelines and recommendations for improving IT security overall.77
Summary.
Norway is responding to a significant number of
attacks against its infrastructure.78 Despite numerous
activities to heighten cyber security, there is still concern about Norway’s vulnerability as a nation dependent on its IT systems.79 Despite the fact that Norway
has only recently begun to integrate cyber defense on
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a national level, previous achievements leave Norway
well placed to be one of the best equipped European
countries for cyber defense. The VDI sensors, in place
since 2000, provide network-specific security and surveillance, while, to some extent, disregarding privacy
issues.
In 2012, Vidar Sandlad, senior consultant to NorSIS, observed that one key cyber security problem is
the naivety of the Norwegian public.80 Programs and
education provided by NorSIS and the information
campaigns established by the Norwegian government
are heightening awareness and knowledge of computer security. Norway appears to be experiencing less
difficulty in communicating to its public the vital role
of individuals in ensuring cyber security than does
Sweden.
SWEDEN
General Structure.
The cyber defense strategies of Sweden are organized primarily through two ministries and their subdepartments: the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Defense is in charge of
eleven divisions, both military and civilian:81
• Swedish Armed Forces (Försvarsmakten)
•	Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment
(Försvarets radioanstalt)
•	Swedish Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut)
•	
Swedish Defense Materiel Administration
(Försvarets materielverk)
•	
Swedish National Service Administration
(Rekryteringsverket/former Pliktverket)
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•	
Swedish National Defense Export Agency
(Försvarsexportmyndigheten)
• Försvarsunderrättelsedomstolen (a court responsible for the judicial review of defense operations)
• Swedish Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen)
•	
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap)
•	Swedish Defense Intelligence (Statens inspektion
för försvarsunderrättelseverksamheten)
•	Swedish Accident Investigation Board (Statens
haverikommission)
The divisions known to be involved in the cyber defense of Sweden are the Swedish Armed Forces, the
Swedish National Defense Radio Establishment (FRA),
and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI).
Under the Ministry of Justice, a sub-department of
the Swedish Police (Svenska Polisen), the Säkerhetspolis
(Swedish Security Service, or SÄPO) is also involved in
cyber defense activities. SÄPO is generally concerned
with national security issues, such as counterterrorism, counterespionage, protection of the constitution,
and protection of officials. However, according to official documents, the SÄPO is also responsible for the
replacement and maintenance of security related IT
components of the Swedish police. A specific example
given is “signal protection material” (Signalskyddmatriel), referring to any component used to protect
communications.
The sub-departments of the Ministry of Defense
may be considered responsible for threats originating from outside Sweden, including military actions,
while the SÄPO and its associated divisions exist to
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protect Sweden against terrorism, espionage, and violations of the constitution. Interaction between the Department of Defense sub-departments and the SÄPO
is much stronger than in other countries in Europe,
which demand a strict delineation between military
and civilian operations.
Detail.
FRA.
Although it is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, the FRA is a civilian institution. It is responsible
for the surveillance of civilian and military communication, as well as the establishment, maintenance, and
support of IT security in governmental institutions
and public enterprises.
The FRA is mostly known for its comprehensive
monitoring of data communications. Monitoring
methods and the Titan communications storage database are controversial issues within Sweden. The existence of Titan was disclosed in a Swedish television
report on FRA collection and storage methods in June
2008.82 It is not disclosed to what extent the FRA stores
communication content and metadata.
The FRA may monitor communications on orders
from the Swedish government, the Chancellery, the
Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Criminal Investigation Department (Rikskriminalpolisen), or the SÄPO.
These orders must be approved by the Försvarsunderrättelsedomstolen, a court responsible for the judicial
review of defense operations.
As a result of adjustments to numerous laws collectively referred to as FRA-Lagen, the FRA officially
is now allowed to monitor Swedish communication

28

links constantly. The data collected is stored up to
12 months and may legally be exchanged with other
nations and research institutions.
Communications monitoring assets available to
the FRA include the HSwMS Orion (A201) SIGINT
vessel and two Gulfstream IV aircraft. In 2010, it was
announced that the outdated Orion would be replaced
by a new warship by 2015. The Swedish government
announcement included a statement that “. . . currently the Baltic Sea is safe.”83 Although the new vessel is
mentioned repeatedly in the context of observations
of the closer seas, this could also imply that the Orion
is to be substituted by a ship more suitable for overseas operations as well.
The annual FRA budget was intended to be increased by almost 5 percent to SEK (Swedish krona)
860 million (approximately $118 million) in 2014.84
Military Intelligence and Security Service.
The Militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten
(Military Intelligence and Security Service, MUST) is
a division of the Swedish Armed Forces and cooperates closely with the FRA, FOI, and others. However,
MUST is also known to work with the SÄPO on a regular basis to expand intelligence and security services
to civilian areas.
MUST is an intensely security-conscious organization, to the extent that (according to interviewees) staff
names are not available even in internal documentation and directories, which refer only to number sequences or aliases. This operational security measure
is intended to counter foreign recruiting, blackmail,
and observation actions targeting MUST employees
due to their knowledge of current operations and
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capabilities. Interviewees note the effect that this has
on former colleagues with a public profile disappearing entirely from view when joining a Swedish intelligence agency, a process some refer to as “going into
the fog.” They also highlight the exotic nature of a
process such as this in a country like Sweden, which
is sufficiently open and public that the Royal Family’s
tax declarations are available online.
With reference to IT security, MUST’s annual report states that it has been involved in the acquisition,
setup, integration, and verification of technical components. It also notes that, since 2013, it has acknowledged that technical components may be manipulated
and impose an IT security risk. MUST referred particularly to doctored computer mice sending data to
external observers, manipulated components including backdoors for attackers, and incidents that seem
to refer to unrecognized transmission of data through
USB.85
As a result of concerns like these, MUST verifies any technical equipment prior to its installation
within the Swedish Armed Forces or its other clients.
In 2013, MUST also published an internal document
describing methods to establish and maintain the security and confidentiality of material in various areas,
including IT systems. Despite the document not being intended for external distribution, a version was
accessible through the Försvarsmaktens file server.86
IT-Försvarsverbandet.
The IT-Försvarsverbandet (ITF) is a division of the
Swedish Armed Forces, known to cooperate with
MUST. The ITF focuses on IT threats, whereas MUST
operates as both an intelligence and security agency
with IT being just one of the areas covered.
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Little information has been released on the ITF,
but a combination of newspaper reporting and the
organization’s public job advertisements show that
the ITF employs an unknown number of IT forensic
specialists as well as operating system developers.87
It recruits individuals capable of analyzing network
traffic and code, capable of exploiting zero-day actions in systems, and having a profound knowledge
of the execution of cyber attacks. It cooperated with
the respected KTH forensic laboratory in analysis of
the Flame virus detected in Stockholm in December
2012, which led to speculation on personnel transfer
between the two organizations.
SÄPO.
SÄPO is the nonmilitary Swedish Intelligence
Agency and is under the jurisdiction of the Swedish
Police National Board. It is involved in protection of
IT infrastructure, recruiting, and employing experts to
install, maintain, and verify components. The SÄPO
may also support MUST with investigations. Interviewees suggested that in contrast to Germany, Sweden historically has “not been strict” with separation
of powers between military and civil security.
FOI.
The Defense Research Agency (FOI) engages in
research rather than operations, but it benefits from
direct access both to public and military policy researchers and to technical experts. As a result, it delivers some of the most significant reports on the IT security situation in Sweden. In particular, these include
reports on:
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•	The risk of social media usage by employees
within the Swedish Armed Forces.88
•	The risk involved in the handling of tasks needing varying levels of security and confidentiality by one user on a single piece of equipment.
Within this report, the need for development
of a so-called reactive network was raised. This
reactive network would be capable of automatically adjusting network security policies to the
current actions performed by the user.89
•	The risk associated with the widespread use
and dependency of Swedish infrastructures on
wireless communication. FOI discussed easily
accessible jammers and their use by criminal
organizations to disrupt Swedish investigation services, emergency response actions and
police operations.90
Summary.
All states experience a wide disparity between
the perception of cyber security risk by the government and by members of the public. In Sweden, this
gulf seems particularly broad. Although the Swedish
population is well-educated and accustomed to using
IT from an early age, general disinterest in the risk of
individual attacks poses a national threat. This disinterest may be a function of Swedish attitudes to and
understanding of privacy.
Privacy and breaches of privacy are terms often
dependent on the sociocultural background of the
user. In some respects, Sweden is an exceptionally
open-minded and public society. Furthermore, its citizens are generally prosperous, which means that the
prospect of minor financial losses is not critical. These
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two factors may lead to the public having a rather casual interest in the security of their electronic devices,
which lowers the acceptability of security measures.
Sweden considers itself well-protected against attacks originating from outside the country, but Swedish networks are vulnerable to internal attacks. At the
same time, the relaxed attitude to privacy works in
Sweden’s favor by providing a permissive environment for government monitoring of communications.
In November 2013, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl
Bildt defended surveillance practices, including cooperation with foreign intelligence partners, by saying,
“We have one of the clearest, most law-abiding and
probably best systems in this regard. I would think
that other countries see us as a role model.” Bildt successfully deflected criticism, defending the FRA law
and arguing that there was sufficient transparency
and oversight of its methods.91
Swedish decisionmakers recognize the risk posed
by individuals to Swedish national cyber security,
thanks to high connectivity and widespread use and
dependency on IT. They are beginning to respond to
this attitude by developing automated security tools
that operate without the involvement of the user.
Despite Sweden being one of the most open societies in Europe, military activities in cyber defense are
kept more confidential than in any other country surveyed. This is a reflection of a broader, and perhaps
paradoxical, acceptance of the role of the military as
a security provider and the necessary level of secrecy
this entails. Interviewees felt that the large areas of
Sweden designated for national security activities
that are inaccessible to the public and only reached
through nonsignposted private roads was sufficiently noteworthy to be brought to the interviewer’s
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attention; in many other countries, the existence of
closed military areas would be entirely normal and
uncontroversial.
This may be a legacy from the pervasive nature of
Cold War preparations for total defense against Soviet
aggression. One classic example is the plan for dispersed basing of the Swedish Air Force during hostilities, including the use of roads as runways, which has
had an enduring effect on the layout of some sectors
of Swedish highways. Interviewees suggested that as
a result, major infrastructure projects in Sweden must
receive approval from the defense forces due to the
risk that changes to transportation, energy, or other
networks may interfere with critical but undeclared
capabilities. This extends to the cyber domain: adaptation of communications networks must receive approval due to the risk of disrupting sensitive surveillance, monitoring, or other capabilities.
The combination of several factors makes Sweden
one of the better protected countries within Europe.
These include:
•	strong (cyber) border surveillance through the
FRA;
•	one central controlling unit protecting Swedish
network infrastructure;
•	the willingness of the Swedish public to accept
and support data monitoring; and
•	generous laws allowing cutting-edge government research on cyber attack methods and
system exploits.

34

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS
Each nation reviewed in this Paper has developed
a distinctive organizational structure it considers (at
present) the best fit for providing for cyber defense,
given its own unique societal, political, and constitutional circumstances. Fundamentally, however, the
cyber challenges each of these states faces are very
similar to those facing the United States. As a result,
this review of national approaches to organizing cyber
defense shows national initiatives that may be helpful
when considered for development in the United States,
but it also illustrates some models and constraints U.S.
policymakers would specifically wish to avoid.
Estonia.
Estonia has the key advantage of being a small and
cohesive society, unified by a generally shared threat
perception and benefiting from advanced infrastructure and an impressively forward-thinking national
government and president. This results in Estonia being a recognized role model within Europe and a vigorous promoter of international cooperation on cyber
defense issues.
Estonia’s wholesale adoption of e-services and egovernment, while facilitating economies and growth,
accepts risk of vulnerabilities. In mitigation, the country explicitly promotes civil integration in ensuring
robust cyber defense. One interviewee noted that:
Estonia has understood that cyber war cannot be responded to through government institutions alone,
but must rather be approached through the collabora-
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tion of governmental institutions, non-governmental
organizations and private sector companies.92

For U.S. policymakers, Estonia provides a case study
of risk versus benefit involved in the moving of government and commercial services online, as well as
NATO becoming a proactive and forward-leaning
partner in facilitating collective cyber defense.
Germany.
Germany seems to promote an open-access policy
regarding its cyber defense strategies, including releasing a surprising depth of technical detail on security standards in both German and English. This policy must present a useful resource to any adversary
seeking to circumvent and subvert those standards.
The dispersed nature of the cyber defense structure has a perceived advantage in that no central
institution presents an attractive single target for attack, just as no single exploit can compromise infrastructure as a whole. But at the same time, despite the
copious public documentation, Germany’s federal
system and constitutional constraints make it difficult
to establish which agency is responsible for defending against which threat; this potentially presents an
even greater challenge for foreign partners such as
the United States, which seeks to increase cooperation
with Germany.
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Norway.
Norway’s response to the challenge of cyber defense still appears to be in active development. But it
has already achieved an impressively compact and
simple organizational structure, in sharp contrast to
Germany.
The sense of vulnerability resulting from dependencies on IT networks is well developed—a problem
accented by the aim of finding economies of administration in areas with very low population densities.
But Norway has been proactive in communicating the
role of the individual in national cyber security (and
overcoming “national naivety”), thereby limiting cyber defense vulnerabilities arising from internal networks. This has resulted in a public education effort
with markedly greater impact than in Germany or
Sweden.
Sweden.
Sweden, too, expresses official concern at the lax
attitude of citizens to “cyber hygiene,” and the resulting potential for increasing vulnerability to cyber attacks at the organizational or national level. This is
in contrast to Sweden’s reportedly robust defenses
against attacks originating outside Sweden, thanks to
a long-standing and proactive interest in close control and monitoring of international communications
traffic passing into and through the country. In some
respects, Sweden has filled the role of a regional cyber defense champion. Past cooperation between the
FRA and U.S. and UK partner agencies has been highlighted in media reporting, and Sweden has acted as
the de facto provider of some aspects of cyber defense
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for Finland, pending legislative reforms intended to
allow Finnish security agencies to inspect their own
data traffic.93
Effective implementation of cyber defense principles is likely facilitated by the relative secrecy in which
they are applied, as noted earlier. In the absence of the
formal supranational relationship provided by shared
membership of NATO, this makes it difficult to assess
from open sources the extent to which effective cooperation between Sweden and the United States can be
further developed.
In short, each national approach has its own advantages and deficiencies.
Advantages.
Germany provides clear national technical security
advice; Estonia is strong in developing and installing
technical solutions to ensure security; Norway has a
robust public education program; and Sweden has
invested heavily in protecting itself against external
threats.
Deficiencies.
Germany suffers from a highly complicated federal system where responsibilities may overlap or leave
gaps; Estonia accepts a degree of risk in its almost
universal move of government services online; Norway is still expanding the capabilities of its recently
established cyber defense forces; and Sweden experiences difficulty involving its public in cyber security
measures.

38

Each of these provides a case study against which
the United States can benchmark and validate its own
cyber defense assumptions.
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